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Introduction
Healthcare is a significant political issue. Specific challenges arise around costs, funding constraints, operational efficiency and effectiveness of care against the background of increasing demand for health services. The cost of healthcare accounts for 9.4% of GDP in developed countries (World Bank 2014) . NHS expenditure for 2013/14 alone exceeded £120 billion, which was funded by general taxation to provide cover for a population of just over 60 million people (UK Public Spending 2014).
The media have repeatedly reported that the NHS is in crisis (Anonymous 2015; Boffey and Campbell 2014; BBC 2015; Colvile 2015) . The NHS has experienced a significant rise in the demand for general practitioner and hospital services over the last years. The supply of health services has not expanded at a similar rate, resulting in the breach of various waiting time targets set by the government. This mismatch between demand and supply of health services poses challenges regarding accountability and transparency (Commons Select Committee 2013) , financial sustainability (National Audit Office 2014) and quality of care (Dixon et al. 2011) . It also provokes more general questions regarding the design of public services (Bichard 2011 ) and even the very survival of the NHS.
Against the background of suggestions that good overall performance ratings for public service organisations may not always translate into good performance (Eckersley et al. 2014; Ahrens and Ferry 2015; , the performance management arrangements of the NHS have, in particular, been called into question (Bevan and Hood 2006; Paterson et al. 2014; Chang 2015) .
The performance indicators used to assess NHS hospitals struggle to capture the complexity of quality of care in terms of effectiveness and impact, and may lead to gaming (Rowan et al. 2004; Bevan and Hood 2006) . The Mid Staffordshire hospital scandal provides a stark illustration of this issue 1 . The public enquiry held in the wake of the scandal concluded that the hospital had put 'targets before care'. The hospital's priorities were its finances and foundation status application rather than its patients (The Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust Public Enquiry 2013). Its performance was judged to be high according to the targets and parameters set by the performance framework, yet its operational activities were a danger to the health and in some unfortunate cases the lives of its patients. Despite these problems, performance management continues to be seen as a panacea to improve the NHS. Indeed a framework of centralised control and hierarchical accountability through financial audit and transparency remains in place, alongside performance audits and recently introduced checks to address quality concerns. Alerted by the unusually high mortality rates, the Healthcare Commission (the NHS care regulator at the time) investigated the matter and found that there were serious issues affecting patient safety. The public enquiry that followed highlighted that the cost-cutting exercises made as a result of the pursuit of foundation trust status were the key reason for poor care.
A gap exists in understanding how governance through performance management came about and expanded during the 13 years of the New Labour government from 1997 to 2010. To address this gap, the paper will consider how New Labour sought to address the perceived NHS crisis it inherited from the outgoing Conservative government in 1997. It will show that alongside significant investment in the NHS, New Labour stuck to the path of neo-liberal health service reforms set out by the Thatcher and Major governments. The hallmarks of new public management (NPM) -the widespread use of explicit and measurable standards of performance, the emphasis on outputs and results, cost containment and efficiency gains, the contract-based relationship between providers and commissioners and the intensification of the encroachment of private sector management practices (Gray and Jenkins 1995; Hood 1995; Lapsley 2008 ) -were deployed in order to address the perceived crisis.
The paper will employ an analytics of government approach (Dean 1999 (Dean , 2010 to critically analyse how the New Labour government used technologies of performance management in a framework of centralised control and hierarchical accountability to frame reforms, operationalise them and legitimate investment. It will be shown how these technologies of performance management disciplined knowledge, identity, and visibility and control in NHS practices.
The paper will now set out a history of accounting and performance measurement in the NHS before the New Labour government through a review of the relevant literature. It will then outline the research methodology and methods, focussing on the analytics of government framework and how it was employed in this study. The analytics of government framework will then be applied to critically analyse the problematisation, modernisation and utopia in the NHS under the New Labour government. Finally, we discuss the conclusions and implications of the paper.
A History of Accounting and Performance Measurement in the NHS before New Labour
Accounting and accountability practices have been used for monitoring the performance of hospitals and doctors (Jackson et al. 2013 ) and as a technology of entitlement (Holden et al. 2009; Jackson 2012 ) long before the creation of the NHS.
Since its creation in 1948, the NHS has undergone numerous reforms (Ham 1997; Levitt et al. 1999) . Subsequent UK governments have mobilised hospital accounting practices with the aim of fostering efficiency, cost awareness and cost containment.
Concerns over the cost and performance of the NHS were raised as early as the 1950s (Levitt et al. 1999) . In 1953, the Minister of Health appointed an independent Committee of Inquiry (generally known as the Guillebaud Committee) with the remit to review the cost (present and prospective) of the NHS and to advise on possible ways of ensuring the most effective and efficient use of funds (Chester 1956 ). The Guillebaud Committee found no evidence for vast increases in the cost of the NHS, and did not recommend wholesale changes to its funding or administration (Anonymous 1956 ). The Committee did however suggest that Burdett's uniform system of hospital accounts, which the NHS had adopted (with few alterations), ought to be supplemented with a departmental costing system, which was more suited to planning, control and performance measurement (Gebreiter 2015; Robson 2003) . The
Committee reassured the medical profession that these management accounting measures were to be regarded as means to ensure the best value for money rather than imposing restrictions on the Service (Anonymous 1956, 32) .
Concerns about the efficiency of the service and the effectiveness of the tripartite 2 administrative arrangements re-emerged in the 1960s and culminated in the first major reorganisation of the NHS in 1974. In 1967, The Joint Working Party on the Organisation of Medical Work in Hospitals issued its first report (known as the Cogwheel report), which recommended the adoption of 'divisions' (i.e. a group of specialties providing a common service and with a call on the same resources (Ministry of Health 1967, 16) (Levitt et al. 1999; Ham 2004 Teams (DMT). The reorganisation aimed to achieve three goals: to unify the service, to improve the coordination between health authorities and related local government services, and to introduce better management (Ham 2004) . RHAs had the responsibility for planning, financing and directing the AHAs, which in turn were responsible for planning the service and appointing district management teams. This was a highly bureaucratic and hierarchical system, a 'corporate pluralism' which was supposed to function through a continuing process of negotiation between national and local organisations (Pettigrew et al. 1992, 47) . Performance evaluation was embedded in the system from the top down (Department of Health and Social Security 1972) . The Secretary of State was accountable for the performance of the NHS and controlled the performance of the functions delegated to the RHAs. The
RHAs controlled the performance of the AHAs and regional officers, ensuring that services were provided efficiently and economically. The AHAs controlled the performance of the DMTs, ensuring that services were provided in accordance with agreed objectives, targets and budgets, to guarantee efficiency and economy. This reorganisation prompted the implementation of financial control based on functional budgets (Perrin 1988, 51; Robson 2007) . Up until the 1974 reform, budgeting were prepared according to 'subjective' analysis, identifying the resources consumed by hospitals per subjective categories like staff costs, supplies etc. This system, however, did not allow tracing how the resources were used and by whom within the functions performed by the hospital departments (Rigden 1983, 64) . Thus, functional areas of management were identified (i.e. nursing, diagnostic departments, catering, estate and finance) in order to establish managerial responsibilities and provide the relevant data for performance evaluations.
The elaborate structure introduced in 1974 created the potential for conflicts between the different levels of authorities. The Merrison Committee (1979) , which engaged in the first wide-ranging review of the NHS since the Guillebaud Committee, criticised the system for being overly complicated and too slow in making decisions (Ham 2004 (Ham 2004) .
The implementation of these reforms heightened the tension and conflict between the government on one hand and clinicians on the other, as the medical profession resisted engaging with budgetary information and processes (Bourn and Ezzamel 1987; Pollitt et al. 1988; Preston et al. 1992; Jones and Dewing 1997; Lapsley 2001 ).
Thus, Mrs Thatcher, the then Prime Minister, set up a private review of the NHS which led to the introduction of the internal-market (The Secretary of State for Health 1989). Once again, the main concern of the reform was to strengthen management arrangements, whilst attempting to develop competition between providers of health care with the separation of responsibilities between purchasers and providers and the establishment of self-governing NHS Trusts and GP (General Practice) fund-holders.
The introduction of the internal market required providers to establish and publish prices for health services, so that they could be 'bought' by Health Authorities and GP fund-holders. The establishment of the prices was a crucial process, which would impact the performance of NHS Trusts. The Trusts were assessed in terms of their ability to meet a required financial return, achieve break-even on income and expenditure and remain within their external financial limits. The penalties for breaching these financial targets were heavy, thus unsurprisingly NHS Trust managers focused primarily on them. However, the shortcomings in costing and budgeting, which underpinned the system of performance evaluation, undermined the exercise and attracted heavy criticism, especially from medical professionals, whose performance scrutiny and requirement to occupy managerial roles had increased (Lapsley 1994; Jacobs 1995; Ham 2004) . High cost variability, lack of robustness and comparability of costing data, the absence of integrated systems of cost and quality data, and the inability of the accounting system to capture the complexity of health services contributed to clinicians' distrust of, and disengagement from, managerial reforms (Bourn and Ezzamel 1986; Jones 1999; Northcott and Llewellyn 2003; Llewellyn and Northcott 2005; Scarparo 2006; Kurunmäki and Miller 2008; GuvenUslu and Conrad 2008, 2011; Chapman et al. 2014 ).
The introduction of management budgeting and market-driven incentives in the 1980s
and 1990s aimed to create a system of performance management that would improve NHS productivity and reduce waiting times (Propper et al. 2008 ). However, it was New Labour' NHS reform programme (Secretary of State for Health 1997 Health , 1999 which instituted a much more aggressive target-driven policy (Propper et al. 2008) and greatly extended the era of governance through performance management inherited from the outgoing Conservative government. The 1997 White Paper claimed to envisage a shift towards a system of accountability centred primarily on quality rather than efficiency (Secretary of State for Health 1997). In England, the modernisation agenda of the New Labour reforms initially abandoned the market and shifted towards an integrated system of care, only to revert back to a system of competition with reforms that introduced 'foundation trusts', 'payment by results' and 'performance ratings'.
The structural reforms by the New Labour government from 1997 to 2010 relied on a 'targets and terror' system of control and governance (Bevan and Hood 2006, 525) , 
Research Methodology and Methods
The paper employs Dean's (1999 Dean's ( , 2010 analytics of government framework to analyse how the New Labour government embarked on a programme of reforms and investment between 1997 and 2010. This covers the 'problematisation' of an NHS in crisis, and the formulation of 'solutions' that increased the plethora of performance management arrangements through targets, ratings and regulations.
The analytics of government framework (Dean 1999 (Dean , 2010 Foucault 1972 Foucault , 1977 Miller 2006, 2008; Lega et al. 2010; Macintosh 2009; Rose and Miller 1992 ). Foucault's notion of government is intended as conduct both in noun and verb forms. As a noun, conduct can mean behaviour and action. As a verb, conduct can signify to lead, to guide, to direct. Thus government assumes a broader significance as 'the deliberate shaping of the way we act' (Dean 2007, 82) .
Within this broad definition, the term governmentality carries a dual connotation (Dean 1999 (Dean , 2010 . First, it is connected with 'mentalities of government' (Miller and Rose 1990; Rose and Miller 1992) , 'a way or system of thinking about the nature of the practice of government (who can govern; what governing is; what or who is governed) capable of making some form of that activity thinkable and practicable both to its practitioners and to those upon whom it is practised' (Burchell et al. 1991, 2) . Second, governmentality is concerned with the relationship between government and other forms of power, specifically sovereignty and discipline.
Studies of governmentality have been concerned with 'regimes of practices', which encompass practices for the production of knowledge and truth engaging multiple forms of technical and calculative rationalities (Dean 2010, 28) . These notions of governmentality engender an analytics of government 'which focuses on the rationalities and technologies of rule and the way a practice of government is invested with an ethos and seeks an end or goal, a telos (Dean 1999 )' (Dean 2007, 82 ).
Dean's analytics of government describes regimes of practices as 'organised ways of doing things', through which rationalities, technologies, authorities and subjectivities are created and sustained (Dean 2010, 30-33) . Thus the aim of the analytics of government is to provide a 'detailed description and analysis of the rationalities, techniques, goals and identities formed in the practices that seek to guide the conduct of oneself and others' (Dean 2007, 83) . He considers the framework of analytics of government as a means to study 'the conditions under which regimes of practices come into being, are maintained and are transformed' (Dean 2010, 31) . Furthermore, Dean (2007) argues that the analytics of government also engenders critical analysis, as it allows exposing the disconnection between the views purported by the 'programmer' (Dean 2007, 83) , the logic of practices and their effects.
An analytics of government begins with 'problematisation' whereby governing activities are scrutinised (Dean 2010, 38) and governmental failings, gaps and difficulties are identified, analysed and developed, in conjunction with the identification of (utopian) solutions that will allow for the remedy of the identified problems (Rose and Miller 1992, 181-183 ).
Dean's framework of analysis of regimes of practices comprises four dimensions, which are separate yet interconnected: 1) fields of visibility; 2) technical aspects (techne); 3) forms of knowledge (episteme); and 4) identity formation. The first dimension, fields of visibility, is concerned with forms of visibility that make possible to identify the objects (who and what) of governance (Dean 2010, 41 (Dean 2010, 42) . The third dimension concerns the values, expertise, language and forms of thought employed as knowledge and know-how in governing practices (Dean 2010, 42) . The fourth dimension is concerned with understanding which forms of identity (individual and collective) programmes of government try to shape. This dimension explores what forms of conduct, behaviour and duties are expected of those who exercise authority and of those who are to be governed, and what capacities and attributes are to be promoted. This refers to people and groups taking on a particular role and characteristics associated with forms of identity through which governing operates. Regimes of practices stimulate, encourage and assign competences, qualities or other specific attributes of identity, rather than pre-ascribe identity (Dean 2010, 43) . Government is characterised as facilitative and preventive rather than directive and distributive (Dean 2007, 84) . Regimes of practices elicit identification as the individuals and groups form a sense of selves through such attributes.
In this paper, the analytics of government framework is applied to archival documentation relating to the 13-year period of the New Labour government in the UK (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) . The documents examined for the purposes of this paper discussed management, accounting, accountability and reporting practices in the NHS. They were published by the Department of Health, various devolved governmental bodies like the Audit Commission, and independent organisations like the King's Fund 4 . The analysis examined these documents to determine the perceived problems, utopian solutions and technologies of performance management that characterised NHS discourses during the New Labour period. Finally, we corroborated our analysis with reference to the extant literature on accounting and accountability in the NHS.
The paper will now apply the analytics of government framework to critically analyse an era of governance through performance management in the NHS under the New Labour government from 1997 to 2010.
Problematisation, Modernisation and Utopia: The NHS under the New Labour Government

Problematisation -Inheriting a Crisis
In the run up to the 1997 general election in the UK, the opposition Labour Party rhetoric in their manifesto was of a NHS under threat that needed to be saved, The inherited challenges were also specifically acknowledged by the independent and highly influential King's Fund in their detailed analysis of the NHS under New Labour (Dixon et al. 2011 ).
The Utopian Solution -Moving on through Investment and Reform
As a 'solution' to the perceived NHS crisis, the New Labour government promised much greater investment. 
8-9)
The New Labour government embarked upon a modernisation and performance improvement drive, including replacement of the Conservative government's internal market policy,
'Expanding and reforming the NHS takes time. (…) The process of modernisation is already underway. The internal market has gone and we have already started to build modern, responsive NHS services. The pace of improvement will now accelerate. Some improvements can be achieved quickly, others will take time.' (Department of Health 2000)
However, contrary to New Labour's pre-election rhetoric, the solution to the inherited problems was sought through the intensification of neo-liberalism and NPM mechanisms. After a brief move away from markets in the wake of the 1997 election, New Labour replaced the accounting-based performance indicators and internal market operated under the Conservative government with an even greater emphasis on marketisation, managerialism and performance measurement in the form of targets, performance ratings and regulatory bodies. Together, these measures amounted to a highly aggressive system of governance through performance management.
Technologies of Performance Management
During New Labour's era of governance by performance management, the 'technologies' (Dean 2010, 42) The golden thread was built upon 'targets' and 'performance assessment frameworks'
that became a measure of overall performance and, in effect, a proxy for measuring care, The targets for the NHS included reducing waiting times, patients to receive treatment at a time that suits them, guaranteed access to a healthcare professional within 24 hours, patient satisfaction, reducing 'major killer' mortality rates and narrowing the health gap in childhood and throughout life for all socio-economic groups and geographic areas. As part of the reforms, these targets were measured and compared as visible and controllable benchmarks for the NHS.
'The NHS Plan highlighted the importance of 'Must do' targets, (…) 16.4 A key message arising from the consultation with the NHS in formulating this
The NHS Plan provided a basis for a golden thread of performance management, and Nevertheless, a frequent concern remained that the articulation and implementation of performance management frameworks were merely legitimacy exercises for highlevel comparisons (Llewellyn and Northcott 2005) . Indicators and targets were deemed to be too high-level and top-down driven, unable to represent the dynamics of local performance (Chang 2006) . Sometimes operational readiness was more opaque.
Indeed, it was argued that small changes to methodology could lead to very different ranking results (Chang 2006) .
The concerns over performance ratings were not without foundation, as they formed part of the changes alongside PbR that informed the reform which linked investment to performance, 'PbR is the latest, and arguably the most significant, development in the financial flows in the secondary care sector since 1948.' (Appleby et al. 2012, 6) The main stimulus for PbR reform in hospital services was the New Labour government 'reducing waiting times for planned operations' targets that needed increased activity levels. Delivering the NHS Plan (Department of Health 2002a) highlighted that block contracts based mainly on fixed total annual budget gave hospitals no incentive to attract additional patients by increasing activity above agreed The initial implementation involved a small number of elective procedures, but was expanded to include almost all elective and emergency care. By 2010, it included about 60 per cent of the average hospital's activity depending on hospital type and activity mix and accounted for around one-third of total Primary Care Trust spending (Appleby et al. 2012, 9) .
Underlying the performance changes in activity levels was the requirement for NHS hospitals to achieve a balanced budget, and New Labour saw PbR as a way to promote greater financial discipline and transparency of NHS organisations. This was because each hospital was paid the same amount for the same service volume, making it clearer when subsidies were necessary from central government to achieve a control stifled managerial autonomy (Hoque et al. 2004) , despite the rhetoric of the benefits of a performance regime that would support front-line staff in managing the delivery of healthcare to meet local communities' needs (Department of Health 2001b , 2008 .
How Technologies of Performance Management Disciplined Knowledge, Identity, and Visibility and Control
The performance management technologies were employed in a framework of hierarchical accountability and centralised control, which in a 'panoptical' manner disciplined knowledge, identity, and visibility and control.
'Knowledge' (Dean 2010, 42) In addition, the New Labour reforms coincided with the Kennedy Inquiry Report The New Labour reforms were similar to those of the Conservative government's internal market between 1991 and 1997, but extended an internal market to a quasimarket. For instance, under the internal market system it was a third party commissioning organisation that decided in which hospital patients would receive elective care, whilst under New Labour individual patients were offered a choice of hospital for elective care and it was the patient's decision that became the driver for resource allocation.
Through the reforms, the 'visibility and control' (Dean 2010, 41 ) of performance had moved from an internal market based upon competition and trading accounts to a market based upon patient choice.
A golden thread of performance management systems enabled performance ratings to be produced for hospitals that were subject to performance audits and published in publicly available league rankings in order to facilitate comparisons. This visibility attracted much media attention and scrutiny as shown in this paper with regards to star ratings, and began to influence or even control the choices of hospital managers (Llewellyn and Northcott 2005; Chang 2006 ).
The performance management arrangements also facilitated the PbR regime (Department of Health 2000 , 2001a , 2001b , 2002a , 2002c , 2002d Healthcare Commission 2005 with funding visibly linked to performance for different procedures. It therefore became much more visible when a hospital had to be bailed out by the government if it could not achieve a balanced budget (Department of Health 2001c) .
At the same time, the codes of conduct, governance mechanisms and accountability arrangements had also been strengthened (Department for Health 2002b , 2003 , 2004 .
Together these changes to stewardship, performance and accountability arrangements heightened visibility through league tables, rankings and balanced budgets and led to more centralised control and discipline.
Discussion and Conclusions
This paper has examined the wide range of financial and operational performance measures adopted by the New Labour government between 1997 and 2010. Drawing on an analytics of government framework, the paper found that the problem of a crisis in funding and performance that the New Labour government inherited from its
Conservative predecessors, and their search for a utopian solution through modernisation based on performance improvement, were addressed by framing reforms and giving them meaning through hierarchical accountability and centralised control arrangements.
The hierarchical accountability and centralised control arrangements relied on performance management technologies that disciplined the knowledge, identity, and visibility and control of practice. For example, the paper illustrated that (a)
'technologies' (Dean 2010, 42) shifted from an internal market based on a purchaser and provider framework towards a 10 year NHS Plan with strategies and detailed lower level plans that aimed to form a golden thread throughout the entire healthcare system (Department of Health 2000; Micheli and Neely 2010) . This was combined with an increased use of targets and standards (Department of Health 2000 , 2001a , 2001b , 2002c , 2002d , 2008 , 2008a Healthcare Commission 2005 . Under New Labour, these performance management measures came to be seen as a proxy for the overall performance of healthcare providers, and much emphasis was placed on high level comparisons of performance metrics, as conducted by regulatory bodies like the Audit Commission, the Healthcare Commission and Monitor. As a result, performance measures were susceptible to 'game-playing' and frequently decoupled from operational realities (Bevan and Hood 2006; Chang 2006 ).
The technologies disciplined (b) 'knowledge' (Dean 2010, 42) . The manufactured market competition disciplined medical and administration knowledge, but this had to shift towards being disciplined by performance measurement, targets and amalgamated ratings used as representation of organisational success in making decisions. Also this was within a market of patient choice that had funding linked to patient decisions across a growing range of healthcare activities (Chang 2009 ).
Greater management and financial skills were therefore required to support medical professionals, and commissioning of activities as they began to replace some direct service provision (Chang 2006) . In addition, to re-assure patients, there was an increased focus on codes of conduct, especially after the Kennedy Inquiry Report (Department of Health 2002b , 2003a , 2003b , 2004 .
The knowledge forged (c) 'identity' (Dean 2010, 43) . The knowledge of healthcare professionals and administrators operating in the public sector began to require knowledge of mixed healthcare provision with the private sector, which shaped identity from being public sector to a more hybridised form of service provision. This involved competition, partnerships, joined up health and social services, and more localised healthcare with larger strategic centres (Department of Health 2000 , 2001b .
In addition, there was more hybridisation of staff with a greater cross fertilisation of medical, financial and managerial knowledge (Department of Health 2001b; Kurunmaki and Miller 2006) .
The identity affected (d) 'visibility and control' (Dean 2010, 41) , which shifted from a focus on competition, trading accounts and accounting ratios to a golden thread of performance management through plans, targets, rankings and league tables (Department of Health 2000; Micheli and Neely 2010) . These worked alongside budgets, cash controls and PbR (Department of Health 2000 , 2001c , 2004b to discipline staff into a culture of 'targets' (Bevan and Hood 2006) and, on occasions, 'terror' (Propper et al. 2008 ).
The framework of hierarchical accountability and centralised control that became New Labour's 'solution' to the perceived NHS crisis had therefore extended neoliberalism and New Public Management into an era of governance through performance management. With reference to New Labour's health policy record between 1997 and 2010, the King's Fund suggested that it included a mix of achievements and disappointments (Dixon et al. 2011) . It highlighted both the increased investment in the NHS, but also the continuous upheaval and reforms the health service experienced during the New Labour years. This paper echoes these sentiments, and suggests that, although it enjoyed some successes, performance management cannot discipline and control health services to solve the myriad problems facing healthcare in the 21 st century. As a result, the accountability and transparency arrangements of the NHS (Commons Select Committee 2013), its financial sustainability (National Audit Office 2014) and the design of public services more generally (Lord Bichard 2011) require further consideration.
